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Abstract 
This paper develops a methodology to analyse the impact of emission taxes for private vehicles for controlling and reducing 
atmospheric pollution. The main feature of the proposed approach is the integration of emissions from individual emitters 
(private vehicles) in Emissions Trading Markets designed for macro-emitters. The presented approach consists of two 
hierarchical levels. At upper level the emissions trading for macro-emitters (cities or consortium of cities) is considered. In this 
work three emission trading schemes are proposed and studied: i) Fixed emission rights per city, ii) Auction market for the 
emissions, which tries to reach the environmental objectives at the minimum cost, and iii) Emissions cap-and-trade scheme. 
These trades allow the system to provide an efficient scheme in a cost-efficiency sense and equity among regulated cities. At 
lower level the behaviour of the users of the traffic network is modelled for each city. A multi-user equilibrium model with 
elastic demand and pollution taxes estimates the emissions produced. The lower level represents the emissions market for private 
vehicles in which the emission taxes paid per user depend on travelled kilometres and the type of the vehicle. The price for each 
ton of (greenhouse gas) emissions is fixed in the Emissions Trading Market. The three schemes have been solved with a fixed 
point approach and a numerical study has been carried out to motivate pros and cons of the above schemes. 
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1. Introduction 
Currently exists an international purchasing and selling market regulated by Kyoto Protocol in which the rights 
on contaminant emissions produced by countries are traded. The main objective of this Protocol is to reduce the 
polluting emissions, therefore, is important to reduce the emissions produced by transport because is an area in 
which they are still growing. 
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Since the implementation of the Kyoto protocol on December 11th, 1997, industrialized countries have had to 
reduce/stop their greenhouse gas emissions in order to meet the international commitments set in the Kyoto Protocol 
Reference Manual (2008). To meet the Kyoto protocol objectives, a number of policies have emerged as the EU 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), also known as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, which is a 
cornerstone of the European Union's policy to combat climate change and its key tool for reducing industrial 
greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively. EU ETS was the first large emissions trading scheme in the world, and 
remains the biggest. It regulates the CO2 emissions from approximately 12,000 installations across the EU, including 
power generators, mineral oil refineries, airlines and other heavy industrial sectors. 
EU ETS scheme is run on a 'cap-and-trade' basis. Emissions from each installation covered by the EU ETS are 
capped each year. An installation that emits less than its allocation can sell the excess EUAs or 'bank' them for 
future use. Conversely, any installation emitting more than its allocation must purchase additional EUAs, or other 
eligible instruments, from the market. Those installations who fail to surrender enough allowances are required to 
pay an excess emissions penalty and remain obligated to purchase the extra allowances they require. This scheme 
exploits differing Marginal Abatement Cost Curves (MACs) in the productive sectors to achieve the goal of 
reducing the emissions and the economic costs. 
Transport is responsible for around a quarter of EU greenhouse gas emissions making it the second greenhouse 
gas emitting sector after energy. Furthermore, transport is one of the few sectors where emissions are still growing 
(see Chapman (2007)). Road transport alone contributes about one-fifth of the EU's total emissions of CO2, the main 
greenhouse gas. The EU has policies to reduce emissions from a range of modes of transport, such as including 
aviation in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and CO2 emissions objectives for new cars and vans.  
Five generic policy instruments could be employed for carbon pricing, carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, emission 
reduction credits, clean energy standards, and fossil fuel subsidy reduction (see Aldy & Stavins (2012)). The 
approaches mainly used in transportation are tradable mobility credits and market-based solutions. Tradable 
mobility credits consider a competition between individual drivers who negotiate their credits. The advantage of this 
approach is its applicability because it considers only one city (see Yang H. & Wang X. (2011) and Nie, Y.M. 
(2012)). This work is focused on a market-based solution approach. The main differences with tradable mobility 
credits are that the competition is established between cities and all users pay with respect to each individual 
emissions. The disadvantage of this approach is the necessity of negotiation between cities, but it guarantees an 
efficient minimization of emissions, meeting the environmental objectives.  
This paper proposes various cap-and-trade approaches for the inclusion of road traffic in the Emission Trading 
Markets. The main challenge is that the users of private vehicles are micro-emitters but the markets are designed 
primarily for large companies (regulated sources). One way to overcome this difficulty would be that certain public 
entities (Central Authority i, CAi) were responsible for the emissions in certain regional area i such as a city or a 
consortium of cities, managing their participation. The CAs should participate in emissions market directly and 
should be involved in the impact of their emission taxes when using private transport (either for commercial or 
personal use) to reduce/finance the acquisition of rights of emissions. In this process a key element is that each CA 
should know the MAC of its area in order to properly manage the purchase/sale of emission rights. This paper 
follows the model proposed by Almodóvar et al. (2011) to represent the MAC of an area which allow to estimate the 
emissions produced by each micro-emitter in a city, depending on the equilibrium price per ton, the user type 
(defined by a vehicle class and social-economic characteristics) and the congestion level of the traffic network 
managed by the CAi. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the market designs for the emission trading, Section 3 
proposes a solution method and Section 4 shows the computational tests performed to illustrate the proposed 
methodology on a synthetic network (Nguyen & Dupuis, 1984). Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main 
contributions of this paper. 
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2. CO2 emission market design for private traffic 
2.1. An equilibrium traffic assignment model for the estimation of emissions 
In this paper we consider the general approach to multi-user equilibrium assignment with elastic demand and 
pollution taxes developed in Almodóvar et al. (2011). This model is formulated as a fixed-point problem in the link 
flow space, over the set of feasible link flow patterns, and it introduces systematically the emission taxes in the route 
utility. These taxes affect the level of demand and the choice of a route in the network. The main features of the 
model are: 
x Users are assumed to be grouped into classes, such that all the users of a class share all behavioural 
characteristics and their vehicle has similar characteristics with respect to the amount of produced emissions. It is 
worth noting that the amount of produced emissions depends on the speed of the vehicles, which is considered in 
the model with respect to the congestion level, but the velocity of each individual user is not known thus they are 
grouped by vehicle characteristics. Considering users’ behaviour, when users deal with a new emission tax their 
reaction depends on the user type.  
x Every kilogram of emissions must be paid at the same price. This price must be independent of the vehicle which 
has generated it (e.g. an ecological car against a Sport Utility Vehicle SUV).  
x The mechanism on emission pricing is to charge depending on the kilometres travelled and/or the vehicle 
characteristics.  
The model can be summarized as follows: 
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First equation describes the flow equilibrium vector *f as a fixed-point equation. The vector t* is the emission 
tolls for the type of users, i.e t=(…, ti,…). The toll ti is applied to the emission per kilometre travelled to users type i. 
This taxes change the utilities of the trip and therefore the behaviour of the demand and the network congestion. 
Second equation calculate the emissions associated to the trip pattern *f considering that the price q is applied to the 
emissions of a single unit of pollution (Euros per ton) calculating the taxes per travelled kilometre for each type of 
user. The output of the traffic equilibrium model provides enough data to estimate the total quantity of emissions ej 
generated by the city j and for an emission tax q and a traffic pattern *f such as  
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The emission price q will be introduced into the traffic equilibrium model in which, because of the elasticity of 
the demand, the traffic equilibrium pattern *f will change due to the new perceived utility affected by the tax q. This 
model can be easily extended to multimodal networks (García and Marín (2005)). 
2.2. Mathematical formulation 
In this section we describe Emissions Trading Schemes for emissions of private vehicles. The objective is to 
integrate these markets within the Emissions Trading System. Therefore, a scheme in which a set of cities form 
consortiums and a central authority j (CAj) manages the emissions policies within the consortium j is defined. CAj 
manages trading directly in the ETS. The formation of consortiums is motivated by several meaningful reasons. First 
is that several cities are urban areas, second is that few inhabitants populations may require collaboration to reduce 
the costs of management and trading. CAj receives revenues from emission rates which are managed in the markets 
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to acquire the rights and/or funding new transportation for reducing emissions. Fig 1 shows the proposed schema for 
agents involved in Emissions Trading Scheme for private vehicles. 
We propose three schemes depending on the rules governing the market: (1) Model 1. Fixed emissions 
allowance per city. (2) Model 2. Auction market of the emissions and (3) Model 3. Emissions cap-and-trade market. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Scheme of agents involved in Emissions Trading Scheme for private vehicles. 
2.2.1. Model 1: Fixed emissions allowance per city 
In this model, the consortium is formed by a single participant. ETS fixes the emissions jeˆ  with j J , each city 
must meet the total allowable emissions. Each local authority j sets its users pollution tax by vector jq  so that these 
environmental objectives are met. In this case, ETS jointly considers all cities in J to establish environmental 
objectives. Once these goals are established, each city has an independent behaviour. This problem is modelled by 
the following bi-level optimization problem [Model 1]: 
  (3)     
  (4) 
  (5)     
  (6)      
  (7) 
The main characteristics of this schema are: (1) ETS’ task is to define the environmental objectives for each 
participant j. (2) Each CAj manages their own taxes and incomes to fulfil the environmental challenges.  
2.2.2. Model 2: Auction market 
In this model, the ETS establish the total allowable emissions eˆ  for the consortiums. The tax q (that each city 
must pay to ETS per emitted ton) is the least amount for the environmental objectives eˆ  to be achieved. Each 
participant j could decide the amount of emission tons to generate but CAj must pay the price of the emitted tons. 
The final price would be fixed following a trading mechanism among the consortiums. The two main features for 
the ETS are (1) to establish the environmental objectives for each participant and (2) to establish the programs in 
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which the collected taxes are spent. These facts are not dealt with in this paper. The proposed equilibrium model is 
shown in [Model 2]. 
  (8)     
  (9) 
  (10)     
  (11)      
  (12) 
                 (13) 
2.2.3. Model 3: Emissions cap-and-trade market  
In this type of market, ETS sets a limit (cap) on the total amount of pollutant that can be emitted within a pre-
determined period and this regulator establishes the initial distribution of total allocation (i.e the total number of 
allowances issued) among the various consortiums (participants). Each CAj manages two prices per emitted ton, an 
equilibrium price q* (as in Model 2) which all cities must pay per ton emitted to ETS and a price qj that is applied to 
the emissions produced by citizens. The difference with previous models is that the trade between cities is permitted, 
allowing cities to purchase and produce more tons than the originally allocated or sell allowances that they have not 
emitted. The price of transactions between consortiums is  q*. 
If Model 2 were applied to heterogeneous cities, cities with large differences in the level of per capita income for 
example, it can lead to an unbalanced distribution of emissions between rich and poor cities. Only would 
contaminate who could afford it. Model 3 aims to achieve the environmental objectives at the lowest possible cost 
and considers an initial distribution of allowances. The traded emissions between cities allow the lowest price q* for 
pollution taxes. Thus a city may emit more tons than permitted by purchasing necessary emission rights at a price q* 
in the market. On the other hand, the incomes obtained from emission rights allow the city to partially pay the 
polluting tax to ETS. This fact makes possible the reduction of the pollution tax qj of participant j. In this model, 
each user of the cities consortium j pays the same price qj per ton emitted depending exclusively on the quantity 
emitted. On the other hand, authorities CA of each city consortium pays q* for tons emitted to ETS and, in case they 
need to purchase new emission rights, these emission rights should be paid to the selling cities at price q*. The 
equilibrium price q* ensures that environmental objectives are achieved. 
The constraint (18) establishes that each city consortium j J  holds the environmental objective. The amount 
of emissions emitted by consortium j J  plus the emission rights trading aj  (purchase emission credits) is equal to 
the allowed emissions for the consortium j J . Note that a value aj ≥ 0 means that the cities consortium purchases 
emission rights and otherwise sells part of their emission rights. The constraint (19) establishes a neutral economic 
balance for CAj, the consortium j pays to ETS for emitting ej tons at a fixed price q by ETS. It is assumed that the 
CAj collects the pollution tax (qj) of their users and controls the trading of emission rights. Constraint (20) indicates 
that the total amount of reported emissions match the total allowed. 
The proposed model is: 
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  (14) 
  (15) 
  (16) 
  (17) 
  (18) 
 (19) 
    (20) 
 
3. Solution methods 
In this section, a numerical method for solving the above models is proposed.  
Model 1 defines implicitly a function ( )j jq*  that provides the quantity of emissions in the consortium j as a 
function of the emission tax qj.  Model 1 can be formulated as:  
 ^  `  0;ˆ:min td* jjjjj qeqq           (21) 
where qj is the tax charged to the users, j* is the total quantity of emissions, which depends on the variable qj, and 
jeˆ is the quantity of emissions allowance.  If qj = 0 is a feasible solution then this toll is optimal. Otherwise, the 
optimization problem is equivalent to (we assume that j*  is a non increasing function) root-finding problem. 
      jjj eq ˆ *           (22) 
The essential issue of the methods to find a root of Eq. (22) is that the function is implicitly defined and a great 
computational effort is needed for its evaluation. This fact is the key reason for requiring the application of solution 
algorithms with high convergence speed. The proposed method is the Regula Falsi method. In the book 
Householder (1970), we can find sufficient conditions for convergence of the previously proposed methods when 
the two initial points are near to the root. The Regula Falsi method has the same structure as the classic bisection 
method but, instead of taking a midpoint, the new point is calculated using the secant method:  
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We use the MSA algorithm to compute the function  jj q* . Table 1 summarizes the MSA algorithm. 
Model 2 can be re-formulated as: 
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In this case the model is solved in a similar way as Model 1 considering      instead of            . 
Table 1: A MSA algorithm for computing )( jj q*  
  Step 0.  (Initialization). Let ,H Hf t  be two tolerance parameters. Let )),0((,0 000 jjj cf tft   and let qj . 
  Step 1.  Computing of traffic equilibrium  
Step 1.1.  Compute the new flow pattern ])),(()[/1(1 AAAA A jsjjjj cf ftfff    
Step 1.3.  If 1j j H  ! ff f , then 1 AA  go to Step 1.1 
Step 1.4.  Compute the new vector of emission tax per travelled kilometre ),( 11 jj
s
j qt
  Aft  
Step 1.5  If 1s sj j H  ! tt t , then 1 ss  go to Step 1.1 
 Step 2.  Evaluation of emissions  
                
 
 
Model 3 takes into account two prices for emissions. The first represents the equilibrium price between the ETS 
and the consortiums, and the other the optimum price qj applied by CAj to users. Considering q as known, CAj 
selects the minimum price that guarantees the payment of the emissions produced in the correspondent region to 
ETS and allows the trade of spare emissions. The optimal value qj depends on q and CAj determines it by solving: 
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We define the tradable allowances for the consortium j: ˆ ˆ( ) : ( ( ))j j j ja q e q q *         (26) 
Therefore Model 3 is equivalent to:   min : ( ) 0j
j J
q a q

­ ½ ® ¾¯ ¿¦               (27) 
Assuming that feasible region of the previous problem consist of a unique element, it is equivalent to find the 
solution of equation               . This problem has been solved using the Regula Falsi method previously 
commented.   
 
4. Numerical results 
The objective of these computational experiments is to illustrate the simultaneous equilibriums produced in the 
model. Users compete to select a route and the number of trips in a city. This fact produces a congestion level which 
defines emission necessities determining the characteristics of participant CAj considering the social-economic 
situation of the population. ETS manage the equilibrium between CAj to define the price of emissions depending on 
the environmental objectives. 
4.1 Case study description 
An ETS comprised by two cities is considered. For each city two types of users are defined. The traffic network 
used in both cities is the given in Nguyen and Dupuis (1984). It is composed by 13 nodes, 19 links, and 4 OD pairs 
W={1,2,3,4}: pair (1-2) with a demand 1ˆT , (1-3) with a demand 2ˆT , (4-2) with a demand 2ˆT , and (4-3) with a 
¦
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demand 4ˆT . The volume-delay functions )( fc are linear. We have assumed that )( fc  is measured in minutes 
depending on the flow (measured in vehicles per hour). We have supposed that the travel speed in the empty links is 
80 kilometres per hour for calculating the kilometres travelled. Both cities have the same characteristics in the traffic 
network.  In this experiment, we considered that there are two types of users for each OD pair whose difference lies 
in the type of vehicle used and therefore the amount of emissions emitted. Fig 2 shows the model emissions Ei for 
each user. 
 
Fig. 2 Emissions for each type of users with respect to average speed in the network (congestion level) 
The following route linearly systematic utility is adopted 
    iiiiiiii Prgv 1GDE      (28) 
where βi, αi are two parameters depending on the class i which homogenize the travel cost and emission cost; 1i is 
a vector of ones with the same dimension as the number of relevant routes Ki; -βi gi -αi ri is a vector of generalized 
costs, that is, the sum of travel time plus the emission cost. The parameters βi, αi  weight both factors, which are 
measured respectively in time units and monetary units. This term is the utility associated with the route choice. 
On the other hand, the value ii PG  represents the utility associated to making the journey in a private vehicle.  This 
term introduces the elasticity on the demand due to the emission taxes. For example, certain types of daily journeys 
as working trips are discouraged because of the emission rates change the transport mode used. A compound utility 
has been considered based on travel time and emission taxes. We have taken as reference the travel time (βi=1) for 
calculating satisfaction si. We have assumed a value of 10 Euros/hour for both types of users thus 60 / 10iD   
(measured in minutes). Parameter iG has been adjusted by calculating the annual cost which would represent a 
polluting tax Pi  per kilometre. 45*10iG   is the value used. Finally 455*10iK  . 
The level of demand is expressed by demand function  
        iiiiii sdsd v  d     (29) 
The model incorporates the elasticity of the demand using a logit function which calculates the number of trips 
in each pair depending on the utility of the travel. Considering these characteristics and the emission taxes the model 
implicitly obtains the number of trips of each type of user. 
Generalized costs decrease progressively in each OD pair as the CO2 eq Tax is increased. It is worth noting that 
this effect produces a reduction in the number of annual trips if the taxes are imposed, but if taxes are included in 
only one trip the cost decreases faster because of the congestion reduction. 
Fig. 3 shows CO2 eq Emissions (Tn) for each city. CO2 eq Emissions decrease progressively in each city as the 
CO2 eq Tax is increased. City 1 is more sensitive to increased CO2 eq Tax. Finally, considering all these factors, the 
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equilibrium model is used to estimate ( )j jq* , which represents the MACs of each city. Fig. 3 represents these 
functions for the two cities showing the differentiated behaviour.  
 
 
Fig. 3. CO2 eq Emissions (Tn) vs CO2 eq Tax (euros/Tn) 
4.2 Numerical results of market models 
It is assumed that ETS divide emission rights equally between both cities, and it is considered that CAj can trade 
the emission rights with respect to the three market types. Fig 4 depicts how the applied taxes q* and qj change in 
each city with respect to the total number of rights eˆ  (Tn) allowed by ETS. Left graph on Fig. 5 shows the 
emissions for each city with models 2 and 3, depending on total allowable emissions eˆ . Right graph on Fig. 5 
depicts the aj (trade allowances for city j), depending on total allowable emissions for each city. Model 3 alleviates 
social-economic differences between cities defining previously given rights. A model focused exclusively on 
demand produces that the richer city can pay their emissions and the poorer city cease to contaminate. 
 
Fig. 4. CO2 eq Tax vs Total Allowable Emissions (Tn) for each city 
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Fig. 5. Emissions and should/brought allowances for each city  
5. Conclusions and future work 
Who pollute pays, but the less possible. This idea allows cap-and-trade schemas. The main problem of these 
markets is that they are designed for emission macro-emitters, and not for micro-emitters as private vehicle users. 
This paper proposes an approach and a numerical tool which deals with this challenge and try to answer the 
questions appeared in its implantation. This mechanism would allow the funding of new green technologies like the 
implantation of the necessary infrastructure for ecological vehicles. 
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